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IV, 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 4A of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court follow the mandate of John 
Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 
1987)? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in allowing Manti, on the 
day of trial and over the objection of Call, to amend its answer 
by alleging the unpled affirmative defense of mitigation of 
damages? 
3. Did the Trial Court err in granting and then 
revoking a trial continuance to allow Call to address and 
prepare for Call's mitigation of damages defense? 
4. Did the Trial Court commit reversible error when 
it failed to submit Call's jury instructions telling the jury 
how to calculate lost profits? 
5. Did the Trial Court err in allowing Manti to 
inject irrelevant and prejudicial issues in the trial 
proceeding? Those issues include, but are not limited to, 
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whether the judgment would be paid out of the jurors pockets as 
taxpayers, and whether Call should he paid for work not 
performed? 
6. Did the Trial Court err in denying Call's motion 
for a directed verdict and in denying Call's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion to 
amend the judgment, or in the alternative, motion for a new 
trial? 
7. Did the Trial Court err in not taxing as costs 
against Manti, the expert witness fees incurred by Call? 
VI. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules and regulations are attached in plaintiff's 
addendum in the addendum to Appellant's Brief. They are: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15; 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59; 
and Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County awarding the 
2 
appellant John Call Engineering, Inc. ("Call") $13,440 plus pre-
judgment interest and costs against the respondent Manti City 
Corp. ("Manti") and a subsequent order denying Call's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding verdict, or in the alternative, motion 
to amend the judgment, or in the alternative, motion for a new 
trial. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. John Call Engineering, sued Manti City for breach 
of an engineering services contract. The contract required Manti 
City to compensate Call according to the contract's schedule of 
rates. (R. 1, 12, plaintiff's exhibit 1.) 
2. After a non-jury trial, Judge Tibbs entered a 
judgment in favor of Manti. Call appealed. (R. 182, 183, 185, 
186. ) 
3. The Utah Supreme Court reversed Judge Tibbs' 
decision and instructed him to determine [Call's] damages and 
enter judgment in favor of Call. John Call Engineering, Inc. v. 
Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987). 
4. Thereafter, the parties conducted additional 
discovery. (R. 123.) 
5. A second trial, this time before a jury, was held. 
(R. 247-261.) 
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6. Call made a Motion in Limine to limit or exclude 
evidence and argument to the following irrelevant and prejudi-
cial issues: 
a) Whether Call should be paid for work not perform-
ed, 
b) Whether the judgment would be paid out of juror 
and/or taxpayer's pockets. 
c) Whether Call mitigated his damages. 
(R. 235-246.) 
7. The Court denied the Motion in Limine and after 
the jury was impaneled, allowed Manti to amend its answer by 
alleging the unpled affirmative defense of mitigation of dam-
ages. (Transcript of Proceedings, January 12 & 13, 1989, p. 67-
73, hereafter "Tr. p. .") 
8. The Court understood the last minute amendment 
would prejudice Call, and offered Call a continuance of the 
trial. (Tr. p. 73.) 
9. Mantirs counsel informed the Court it had no 
objection to continuing the trial. (Tr. p. 75.) 
10. However, when Call accepted the continuance the 
Court changed its mind and revoked the continuance. (Tr. p. 7 5-
76.) 
11. Thereafter, the Court allowed argument on 
mitigation of damages, (Tr. p. 182) and approved a jury 
instruction on mitigation of damages, (Jury Instruction No. 21.) 
12. Over the objection of Call's counsel, the 
following irrelevant and prejudicial arguments and issues were 
allowed to go to the jury: 
a) The contract was in dispute (Tr. p. 79-81). The 
Utah Supreme Court in Call, supra, had previously 
construed the contract in favor of Call. 
b) Call prepared a sewer system which was not accept-
able to the State Board of Health. (Tr. p. 81). 
c) Call was paid for everything he did. (Tr. p. 81). 
d) Call was not allowed to proceed without written 
authorization from Manti City. (Tr. p. 210-211). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Call, supra, held the 
contract's authorization to proceed provisions 
did not excuse Manti's failure to pay Call. 
e) That taxpayer's would have to pay any judgment. 
(Tr. p. 318). 
13. At trial, Call sought to recover lost profits. 
Call established his lost profits by expert opinion, past 
financial records, the opinion of the business owner, records of 
similar businesses and testimony of a similar business owner. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 32-38, 42; Tr. p. 88-301.) 
14. Defendant put on no case whatsoever, except for a 
few perfunctory questions to, David Thurgood, the engineer hired 
by Manti when Manti breached Call's contract. Call, supra; (Tr. 
p. 315, 316.) 
15. The uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence at 
trial showed that John Call Engineering, Inc. was entitled to 
damages ranging from $191,998 for a high to $57,990 as set forth 
below. 
Evidence Amount of damages 
John Call Contract, Testimony 
of John Call and Expert Testimony 
of Randy Peterson $191,998.00 
OR 
The Expert testimony of Chuck 
Peterson, of Frank Stuart & Associates $136,334 . 00 
OR 
Gross Receipts as Determined by Randy 
Peterson multiplied by the Average Profit 
Margin Taken from Call's Financial Records 
from 1981 through 1986 $ 70,278.00 
OR 
Gross Receipts called for by the Call 
Contract multiplied by Thurgood's estimated 
Profit Margin $ 57,990.00 
16. At the close of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff 
moved the Court for a directed verdict in the sum of not less 
than $56,377. The Court denied plaintiff's motion without 
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prejudice but on the record, expressed its concern to counsel 
that Call had put on a thorough case consisting of financial 
records and expert testimony and evidence of similar business 
owners while Manti put on no evidence at all. (Tr. p. 316.) 
17. The Court failed to present Call's proposed jury 
verdict form and instructions telling the jury how to calculate 
lost profits. (Tr. p. 303, 312; Call's proposed Jury 
Instruction Nos. 8, 12 and 12 amended.) 
18. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Call for 
$13,440. (R. 262.) 
19. Call filed timely motions under Rule 50 and 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, or in the alternative, motion to amend the judgment, 
or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. (R. 276-294.) 
20. The Trial Court denied Call's motions and denied 
Call's request for expert witness fee costs. (R. 335-336.) 
21. Call appealed. (R. 339-340.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE 
THE UNPLED MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Court allowed Manti city to amend its answer to 
allege the unpled mitigation of damages affirmative defense. 
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The amendment occurred nearly 6 years after the litigation com-
menced and after the jury was impanelled• 
The amendment prejudiced Call because Call was not 
given time to prepare the issue for trial* 
Further, the amendment was contrary to the Utah Supreme 
Court's ruling in John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (1987). 
Finally, by waiting until trial to move to amend, Manti 
waived any mitigation of damages issue. 
POINT II - THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court in John Call Engineering, Inc. 
v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) instructed the 
lower court to determine Call's damages and enter judgment in 
favor of Call. 
The trial court did not do that. Instead the trial 
court, over Call's objections, allowed irrelevant and prejudi-
cial arguments and issues into the trial such as: 
1) Whether the contract was in dispute; 
2) Whether Call should be paid for something he had 
not done; and 
3) Whether Call should have mitigated his damages. 
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POINT III - THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL 
Allowing Manti to amend its answer at trial prejudiced 
Call. The trial court knew Call was prejudiced and offered a 
continuance. Manti agreed to the continuance. But, when Call 
accepted the continuance, the court changed its mind. The trial 
court's abuse of discretion requires a new trial. 
POINT IV - THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS TELLING THE JURY HOW TO CALCULATE 
CALL'S LOST PROFITS 
The Court has a duty to tell the jury how to measure 
or calculate Call's damages. Call submitted jury instructions 
and a verdict form to assist the jury in determining Call's lost 
profits. 
The trial court refused the instructions and the ver-
dict form. Further, the trial court totally failed to instruct 
the jury on how to determine Call's damages. The jury was unin-
formed and allowed to use its imagination. 
POINT V - THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR AWARDED A NEW TRIAL 
Call established his lost profits by: 1) testimony of 
the business owner; 2) financial records; 3) expert testimony; 
4) testimony of a similar business owner, and 5) records of a 
similar business owner. 
Manti's case consisted of a few questions to one of 
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Call's witnesses- The court acknowledged that Manti's case was 
minimal. The uncontradicted evidence shows that Call was en-
titled to a judgment of at least $56,377. 
POINT VI - THE COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND 
PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY 
Over the objection of Call's counsel, the trial court 
allowed issues previously ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The issues were prejudicial and confusing to the jury. In 
addition, the trial court informed Manti that the court would 
sustain objections to certain types of arguments. Nevertheless, 
Manti caused the following prejudicial arguments and issues to be 
conveyed to the jury: 
1) The contract was in dispute. In fact, the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the only issue was 
damages. 
2) Call should not be paid twice for work not 
performed. 
3) Call could not proceed without written authori-
zation. Contrary to Manti's argument, the Utah 
Supreme Court had ruled the written authorization 
clause of the contract was not an excuse for not 
paying Call. 
4) The verdict would come out of taxpayers pockets. 
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Each of the foregoing arguments either was contrary to 
the Supreme Court's ruling and/or prejudicial to Call. Each 
requires a new trial, 
POINT VII - CALL SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE 
COSTS 
Because establishing lost profits in a contract case 
is a complex process, Call needed expert testimony. That expert 
testimony was expensive. Previously, the Utah Supreme Court has 
allowed costs for expert testimony taken by deposition. It makes 
no sense to allow costs for expert deposition testimony but not 
allow costs for expert trial testimony. 
X. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE 
THE UNPLED MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
A. Factual Background 
Call's complaint was filed on March 17, 1983. Manti's 
answer was filed on April 7, 1983. The answer did not contain 
the mitigation of damages affirmative defense. (R. 19-20.) 
Mitigation of damages was not an issue in the first trial nor in 
discovery proceedings both before and after the first trial. Up 
to the date of the second trial, Manti never sought an order 
allowing it to amend its answer. 
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In summary, during the nearly six year period from the 
time Manti filed its answer up to the date of trial, Manti never 
sought nor obtained an order allowing it to amend its answer to 
plead mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense. 
The Court, over Call's objections, denied plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine and granted defendant's motion to amend its 
answer by alleging the mitigation of damages affirmative defense. 
However, realizing that Call was prejudiced by the Court's 
ruling, the Court offered Call a continuance. 
I'm going to grant the motion. . .Now if you 
want a continuance of the case and you feel 
that's proper, Counsel, I'll grant you a 
continuance. 
(Tr. p. 73.) 
Manti's attorney also realizing that Call was 
prejudiced had no objection to the trial being continued. (Tr. 
p.75). However, when Call's counsel explained that neither he 
nor Call were prepared to try the mitigation of defense issue and 
accepted the Court's continuance, the Court changed its mind. 
I'm changing my thing. We are going forward 
and we're going to allow it [the amended 
answer]. . . .it's my responsibility to go 
forward in the interest of judicial economy. 
(Tr. p. 75-76.) 
Thereafter, Manti was allowed to present the mitigation 
of damages issue to the jury. 
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Now the city's position is that once he 
[Call] was informed — this would be the 
evidence that will be introduced — once he 
was informed that he was no longer on the 
job then he had knowledge of what the situa-
tion was and was put in a position where he 
could take various corrective action to 
minimize the loss he would sustain by not 
doing this job, if any. 
(Manti's counsel's opening statement tr. p. 83.) 
The Court then allowed evidence on the mitigation of 
damages issue and followed up with the following jury 
instruction. 
John Call upon his first notice of breach of 
contract on March 23, 1982 had a duty to 
mitigate any damage he may have sustained. 
This action requires a course of conduct on 
his part to cut his losses. 
(Jury Instruction No. 21.) 
Bo Legal Analysis 
After the first trial, the Utah Supreme Court limited 
the trial issue to one, the amount of Call's damages. John Call 
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp. 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1987). 
This case is reversed and remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to determine 
plaintiff's damages and enter judgment in 
favor of Call. 
Call, at 1210. 
The Supreme Court instructed the Trial Court to 
determine Call's damages, not to determine whether Call should 
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have mitigated his damages. But the trial court, disregarded the 
instructions of the Utah Supreme Court, 
The trial court's action was not only contrary to the 
Utah Supreme Court's ruling but also contrary to well settled 
case law, 
U.R.C.P. 8 requires the party to set forth in his 
answer "any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense," Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, e.g. 
Pratt v. Board of Education 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). When a 
defendant fails to plead an affirmative defense, he waives the 
affirmative defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction Co., 682 
P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
In Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986) the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically held that the failure to plead 
mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense, waives any 
mitigation of damages issue at trial. Gill, at 1357. 
Call's counsel made the Court aware of the Gill 
opinion. (Tr. p. 71.) However, the trial court disregarded Gill 
and disregarded the specific instructions imposed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Instead, the court encouaraged and allowed Manti 
to amend its answer after the jury had been impanelled. 
A party's pleadings may be amended only in the sound 
discretion of the Trial Court. Wasechea v. Terra, Inc., 528 
14 
P.2d 802 (Utah 1974). However, if the Court abuses that 
discretion, the decision will be reversed Gillman v. Hansen, 26 
Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971); Lloydfs Unlimited v. Nature's 
Way Markets, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1988). It is an abuse 
of discretion to allow an amendment which prejudices the other 
party. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983). 
Because last minute amendments asserting new issues 
almost always prejudice the other party, the courts routinely 
refuse to grant eve of trial amendments. See, Hein's Turkey 
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 
271, 470 P.2d 257 (1974); Girard v.Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1983); Staker v. Huntington/Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 
188 (Utah 1987). 
C. Call was Prejudiced 
In this case, Call was prejudiced in the following 
ways: First, pursuant to the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court, 
Call was entitled to have as the sole trial issue, the measure of 
damages sustained by Call. The trial court took that right away 
from Call. Second, Call was prejudiced because the amendment 
inserted a new issue into the proceedings in which Call was not 
prepared to try. 
Call's counsel explained that Call was prejudiced. 
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I don't know what his theory is your honor 
and it hasn't been an issue that's gone 
through discovery. . ,1 haven't got the 
foggiest idea what questions he's going to 
ask my witness. And I would have prepared 
for it before coming to trial. 
(Tr. p. 72.) 
The Court knew that Call was prejudiced. 
Counsel, I'll grant you a continuance. I 
don't want to, but I will, if you feel that 
you could reach and bring some more evidence 
in that would help you in this. 
(Tr. p. 73.) 
Manti's counsel also knew that Call had been prejudiced 
and agreed to the continuance. 
I wouldn't have any objection to a con-
tinuance. 
(Tr. p. 75.) 
However, despite the fact that Call was prejudiced and 
the Court knew Call was prejudiced, the Court unilaterally 
revoked its offer to continue the trial, allowed the amendments, 
and forced the trial to begin, all of which prejudiced Call. 
D. Conclusion 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the first appeal determined 
that the sole issue to be tried was the measure of Call's 
damages. The trial court disregarded the ruling of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Further, the trial court disregarded the reported 
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decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and 
allowed the amendment inserting new issues into the trial. The 
record shows that Call was prejudiced. For these reasons, the 
Court should reverse the judgment entered in the lower Court and 
order a new trial. 
POINT IT - THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A. Factual Background 
In this case, the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court 
was simple. 
This case is reversed and remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to determine 
plaintiff's damages and enter judgment in 
favor of Call. 
Call, at 1210. 
The appellate Court's decision on all issues 
considered by the appellate Court is binding upon the trial 
court. Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985). When a 
judgment is reversed and remanded with specific instructions, the 
lower court is bound to follow the instructions and the case is 
treated as if a trial had not been held. Hidden Meadows 
Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). 
No new defenses existing at the date of the appellate 
Court's decision may be heard. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error 
§992 at 419 (1962). The decision of the appellate Court is the 
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law of the case- Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 
Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948). 
In this case, the Court directly violated the mandate 
of the Utah Supreme Court, Rather than simply determining Call's 
damages, the Court allowed the jury to also determine whether 
Call should have mitigated his damages. The failure of the trial 
Court, to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court, requires 
this Appellate Court, to either enter a judgment consistent with 
the Utah Supreme Court's mandate or order a new trial. 
POINT III - THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE CASE. 
A. Factual Background 
After the trial court erroneously ruled that Manti 
could amend its answer almost six years after commencement of 
the litigation and immediately after the jury was impanelled, 
the Court offered plaintiff a continuance,, 
I'm going to grant the motion. . .if you 
want a continuance of the case and you feel 
that's proper, Counsel, I'll grant you a 
continuance. 
(Tr. p. 73.) 
Manti's counsel agreed that a continuance was warranted 
by Manti's amendment. 
We wouldn't have any objection to a 
continuance. 
(Tr. p. 75.) 
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When Call accepted the continuance, because he was not 
prepared to try the mitigation of damages issue, the trial judge 
changed his mind. 
I'm changing my thing. We are going forward 
and we're going to allow it. . .it's my 
responsibility to go forward in the interest 
of judicial economy. 
(Tr. p. 75-76.) 
As set forth in Point I above, the jury was then 
allowed to consider the issue of mitigation of damages. 
B. Legal Analysis 
Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes 
a continuance or postponement "upon good cause shown." The good 
cause in this case was the Court allowing the new mitigation of 
damages issue to be injected into the trial proceedings. 
Frequently, when courts allow a party to amend its pleading, the 
court will continue or postpone the trial to minimize the 
prejudice to the other party. See e.g., Commercial Credit Corp, 
v. Harris, 510 P.2d 1322 (Kan. 1973); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 545 
P.2d 657 (Mont. 1976); Eagle River Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. 
District Court in and for Eagle County, 647 P.2d 660 (Colo. 
1982) . 
Whether a trial should be continued, is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 
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P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988). The decision will be reversed when there 
is an abuse of discretion, Bairas v. Johnson/ 13 Utah 2d 269, 
373 P.2d 375 (1967). An abuse of discretion occurs when a party 
is prejudiced. Malasarte v. Coleman, 393 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1964). 
In Malasarte, the Trial Court, permitted the plaintiff 
to amend its breach of contract complaint to add a claim for 
negligence after the trial commenced. The defendant moved for a 
continuance. The continuance was denied. On appeal, the Court 
ruled that by allowing a new issue to be injected into the trial, 
the defendant was prejudiced requiring a continuance. The 
Court's failure to grant the continuance was reversible error 
requiring a new trial Malasarte v. Coleman, 393 P. 2d 902, 907 
(Alaska 1964) . 
Malasarte, is four square with the present action. 
Both cases involve a breach of contract case. After the trial 
commenced, the Court, in both cases, allowed both parties to 
amend and create new trial issues. The responding parties moved 
for a trial continuance to prepare for the new issues. The 
denial of the motions for a continuance prejudiced the responding 
parties. (See, Point I, above.) Denial of the continuance was 
reversible error and requires a new trial. Malasarte, supra. 
C. Conclusion 
The trial court prejudiced Call when it allowed Manti 
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to amend its answer. The remedy to lessen the prejudice caused 
by an amendment, is to postpone the trial. Call accepted the 
court's offer and requested a continuance. The Court's denial 
of the requested continuance, prejudiced Call and requires a new 
trial. 
POINT IV - THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS TELLING THE JURY HOW TO CALCULATE 
CALL'S LOST PROFITS 
A, Factual Background 
From day one of this litigation, the issue was the 
amount of Call's lost profit as a result of Manti's breach of 
the engineering services contract. Furthermore, the trial judge 
knew that the only issue to be tried was the calculation of lost 
profits. 
He's [Call] entitled to his benefit of his 
bargain, in my opinion. The benefit of the 
bargain is his profit on the deal and that's 
it. What he would receive, less his 
expenses, less the profit, that's what he's 
entitled to. 
(Tr. p. 71.) 
Call requested the following instructions. Jury 
Instruction No. 8 informed the jury of the rates Manti agreed to 
pay Call. 
Jury Instruction No. 8: 
You are instructed that the contract entered into 
between the plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc., and defendant 
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Manti City, required Manti City to pay for engineering services 
at the following rates: 
Hourly Rates 
Principal 48.00 
Project Manager 39.00 
Project Engineer 33.50 
Design Draftsman 22.50 
Senior Draftsman 24.00 
Draftsman 20.00 
Clerical 14.00 
Two Man Survey Party 47.00 
Three Man Survey Party 53.50 
Four Man Survey Party 64.50 
Computer Time 13.00 
In addition, Manti was to pay the plaintiff a mileage 
allowance as follows. 
Automobiles .33/mile 
Trucks .43/mile 
Jury Instruction No. 12 and Amended Jury Instruction 
No. 12 told the jury how lost profits are calculated. 
Jury Instruction No. 12; 
In deciding the amount of damages; you are to award 
John Call Engineering, Inc., you are to use the following 
formula: 
First, determine the amount of money John 
Call Engineering would have received if Manti 
had allowed Call Engineering to fully perform 
the engineer service contract. 
Next, subtract the expenses that Call 
Engineering saved by not having to perform 
the contract. In other words, determine 
what Call's costs to complete the contract 
would have been. In determining the expen-
ses Call Engineering saved, you do not 
subtract fixed overhead expenses that did 
not decrease when Call was prevented from 
completing the contract. 
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The answer is the lost profits or damages 
that are to be awarded to Call. 
Amended Jury Instruction No. 12; 
In a business such as John Call Engineering, there are 
two general types of expenses. These may be referred to as 
variable expenses and fixed expenses. 
Variable expenses are those expenses which can be saved 
if the contract is not performed. For example, the contract 
provided that John Call would be paid $20 per hour for a 
draftsman. However, suppose the draftsman actually cost John 
Call $12 per hour. When the contract was cancelled, John Call 
had a chance to save that $12 because he did not have to hire or 
pay for the draftsman. Thus, $12 would be a variable expense. 
On the other hand, a fixed expense is an expense which 
cannot be saved if the contract is not performed. For example, 
the rent on John Call's office would remain exactly the same 
whether or not the Manti contract was cancelled. 
In order to determine John Call's lost profits on the 
Manti contract, you should follow these steps: 
1. Determine the full amount of money John Call would 
have received if Manti City had not breached its 
contract. 
2. Subtract the variable expenses as that term has 
been explained to you. 
3. Do not subtract fixed expenses, as that term has 
been explained to you. 
4. The result of these calculations is referred to 
as "lost profits." 
In addition, plaintiff proposed a verdict form which 
would assist the jury in calculating the lost profits. A copy 
is attached in the addendum. The court refused each of the jury 
instructions and the verdict form. Call's counsel objected that 
the court's verdict form allowed the jury to compute lost profits 
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in any which way that they could imagine. (Tr. p. 307). Call's 
counsel also explained that Jury Instruction No. 8 was necessary 
to assist the jury in calculating the gross revenues that Call 
would have received. (Tr. p. 308). Call's counsel also objected 
to the Court failing to use the formula set forth in Jury 
Instruction No. 12. Call explained that denying the jury 
instruction prevented the jury from receiving the information it 
needed to rationally calculate Call's lost profits. 
The only instructions the Court gave the jury to assist 
them in calculating lost profits were Jury Instruction Nos. 15, 
16 and 18: 
Jury Instruction No. 15: 
Because Manti City breached its contract to 
plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc., 
plaintiff John Call is entitled to be awarded 
damages in the amount sufficient to place the 
plaintiff in as good a financial position as 
if the plaintiff had been allowed to perform 
the contract and had received payment in full 
from Manti City. 
Jury Instruction No. 16: 
Lost profits may be awarded John Call 
Engineering, Inc. if there is evidence from 
which the amount of lost profits can be 
established. Evidence include expert 
opinions, past financial records, subpoena 
of the business owners, the records of a 
similar business and the testimony of a 
similar business owner. 
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Jury Instruction No. 18: 
You are instructed evidence of another 
experienced and comparable business may be 
used by you as evidence in computing 
plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc.'s 
damages. 
The jury came back with a verdict of $13,144. 
B. Legal Analysis 
The idea of awarding breach of contract damages on the 
basis of lost profits, is not a novel nor new concept to the Utah 
Courts. A non-breaching party to a contract [Call] has always 
been entitled to an award of damages which would place him in as 
good a position as he would have been had the contract been fully 
performed. Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800, 803 
(Utah 1981); Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 
P.2d 197 (Utah 1969) . 
To place the non breaching party in as good a position 
he would have been, absent the breach of contract, requires a 
verdict equal to the lost net profits. Sawyer v. FMA Leasing, 
Co. 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). 
In Cook Associates v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161-66 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that lost profits could be 
established by past earning records, evidence of subsequent 
earnings, and expert testimony of profit potential. The Utah 
Supreme Court has also set forth the formula for calculating 
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lost profits. Lost profits are determined by computing the 
difference between gross profits and the direct expenses which 
would be incurred in earning the profits.. Id. Acculog Inc. v. 
Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), see, Holman v. Sorenson, 556 
P.2d 499 (Utah 1976); Sawyer, supra. Breach of contract damages 
are the contract price less the reasonable costs of completion. 
See also, Covington Bros, v. Valley Plastering Inc. 566 P.2d 814 
(Nev. 1977). 
When the Utah Supreme Court directed the trial court 
to determine Call's damages (Call, at 1210), the only issue for 
the trial court to determine was Call's lost profits. Call 
submitted jury instructions informing the jury as to the types 
of evidence that could be used to determine lost profits, i.e. 
expert testimony, subsequent earnings, profits established by 
similar business. Those instructions were given. 
However, Call also submitted Jury Instruction Nos . 8, 
12 and Amended 12 to assist the jury in calculating those lost 
profits. Those jury instructions were based upon compelling 
Utah Supreme Court case law, i.e. Cook Associates, Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); Acculog Inc. v. Peterson, 
692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984); Sawyer v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 
773 (Utah 1986); Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976); 
Penelko v. John Price Associates, 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982). 
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The court wholly failed to tell the jury how lost 
profits were to be calculated. When a Court fails to give a 
requested jury instruction, the inquiry to determine whether the 
case should be remanded for a new trial, is whether the issues of 
fact necessary to be determined and principles of laws applicable 
thereto were correctly presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable manner. Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 
P.2d 701 (Utah 1969). In this case, they were not. The jury was 
given the facts but they were not given any assistance by the 
Court in applying the law to determine the amount of damages. 
The jury did not know how to calculate damages. They were free 
to roam and ignore plaintiff's uncontested evidence and pay heed 
to irrelevant and prejudicial arguments. 
It is the duty of the Trial Court to instruct the jury 
as to the proper measure of damages. City of Phoenix v. Wade, 
428 P.2d 450 (Ariz. App. 1967). An instruction which says only 
that damages can be awarded, is inadequate and requires a new 
trial. Billings Leasing Co. v. Payne, 577 P.2d 386 (Mont. 1978). 
Because the trial court did not tell the jury how to 
determine Call's lost profits, Call must have a new trial. 
C. Conclusion 
Breach of contract damages, are measured by lost 
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profits. The Utah Supreme Court, in a line of cases cited above, 
set forth the types of evidence that can be used to establish 
lost profits and the formula to be used in calculating lost 
profits. The trial court instructed the jury as to the types of 
evidence that can be used to establish lost profits but failed to 
provide the jury any guidance whatsoever to assist them in 
calculating Call's lost profits. The failure to properly 
instruct the jury reversible error and requires a new trial. 
POINT V - THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR AWARDED A NEW TRIAL 
A. Factual Background 
The first trial and subsequent appeal conclusively 
established that: 1) Call and Manti entered into an engineering 
service contract for engineering services wherein Manti agreed 
to compensate Call according to a schedule of hourly rates; 2) 
Manti unlawfully breached the contract by hiring another en-
gineering firm; and 3) Call was entitled to damages. 
As set forth in Part IV of this brief, Call's damages 
were Call's lost profits. 
At trial, Call established lost profits by: 1) expert 
opinions; 2) past financial records; 3) the opinion of the 
business owner; 4) records of similar businesses; 5) testimony of 
a similar business owner; all consistent with the cases cited in 
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Point IV of this brief. 
Defendant put on no case whatsoever except for a few 
irrelevant questions to David Thurgood, the engineer who replaced 
Call. At the conclusion of all the evidence the court said: 
I want to put on the record, though, Mr. 
Frischknecht [Manti's counsel], I am 
concerned about this that I'd just be blunt 
about it, you have no expert testimony at 
all in this case and I am a little concerned 
because you put the Court into this position. 
If you rest and offer no testimony and no 
expert position, expert testimony that if it 
were appealed, I don't know how the Supreme 
Court would treat it. And I don't know how 
else to say it, but I'm concerned about it, 
to be blunt about it, and I think in fairness 
to you I ought to tell you that, that I am 
concerned about it and I don't see anything 
you can do about it now. But I felt I'd put 
it blunt right now so you know what I thought 
at this point in the proceedings. I am con-
cerned about it. The plaintiff has brought 
in experts. They put in everything. You've 
done nothing but pick them apart and you put 
nothing in the affirmative for yourself to 
indicate what your experts would do. What 
I'm saying is I think you put this Court in a 
very untenable position and if this case is 
appealed to the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals, 1 think you put them in an untenable 
position and I thought I'd put it on the 
record so that depending on what happens it 
would be there. 
Transcript, p. 315-316. 
Judge Tibbs was correct, Manti put on no case 
whatsoever. The contradicted and unimpeached evidence showed the 
following: 
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1) In October of 1980, Call contracted with Manti to 
provide for engineering services. Phase one involved the 
preparation of preliminary report and sewer study suggesting 
several alternatives. Subsequent phases dealt with the design, 
supervision, installation and other sewer engineering services. 
Call v. Manti, at 1205. 
2) The terms in the contract were clear and 
unambiguous. Call, at 1205. 
3) Pursuant to the agreement, Manti agreed to 
compensate Call according to the contract's written fee schedule 
and to pay for costs and mileage. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The 
fee schedule and mileage are set forth in Part IV of this brief. 
The contract does not have a ceiling limiting the amount of money 
to be paid to Call. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
4) Plaintiff breached the contract by hiring another 
engineering firm, David Thurgood, who completed the project. 
Call, supra. (Tr. p. 90.) 
Both David Thurgood, the replacement engineer, and 
John Call testified that the rates contained in the Call contract 
were reasonable. 
Questions Mr. Thurgood, based upon your experience and 
training as a Consulting Engineer, do you have 
an opinion as to whether the rates contained on 
Table 1 were reasonable back in 1981? 
Answer: They're reasonable. 
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(Tr. p. 107.) 
Question: Mr. Call, based upon your experience 
and education as a professional 
engineer, do you have an opinion as to 
whether the rates, contained in your 
contract, were reasonable back in 
1981, when the contract was entered 
into? 
Answer: They were reasonable. 
(Tr. p. 166.) 
No contrary or impeaching evidence was presented by Manti to 
contradict the reasonableness of the fee schedule. 
David Thurgood, the replacement engineer, then 
testified as to the number of hours each employee of Thurgood & 
Associates spent to complete the project. His time records were 
admitted into evidence. (Exhibit 3, Tr. p. 93.) 
No one questioned that the hours put into the project 
by Mr. Thurgood's firm were reasonable. Prior to trial, Call 
had examined Thurgood's time records. (Tr. p. 170.) Mr. Call's 
opinion was that the hours expended by Thurgood were reasonable. 
(Tr. p. 171.) He further said that had his firm been allowed to 
complete the project, Call would have spent the same hours as 
Thurgood & Associates spent on the project. 
Answer: They would be similar. There's 
going to be some variance, but it 
wouldn't be significant. . .Three 
to four percent. 
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(Tr. p. 171.) 
There was no contrary testimony as to the number of 
hours of engineering services required to complete the contract. 
Call then calculated the amount of gross receipts he would have 
received had he been allowed to complete the project. That is, 
Call's hourly rates times Thurgood's hours. The total came to 
$377,844.23. 
Randy Peterson, a Certified Public Accountant, was 
called as an expert witness. He too calculated the amount that 
Call would have received by taking Thurgood's hours and applying 
Call's contract rates. He then added in the costs and mileage 
that Call Engineering would have receivcsd and came up with a 
total of $386,600. (Exhibit 38, Tr. p. 150.) There was no 
contrary evidence offered by Manti. 
Call then testified as to the amount of expenses he 
would have saved by not having to complete the contract. They 
totalled $185,846. (Exhibit 42, Tr. p. 183-193.) 
In summary, the uncontradicted, and unimpeached 
testimony established the reasonable hours necessary to complete 
the contract and the reasonableness of Call's contract rates. 
Multiplying the contract hours by the contract rates shows 
unquestionably that Call would have received at least $377,844.23 
in gross receipts. Call's firm would have saved $185,846 by not 
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having to complete the contract. Call's damages were 
$191,988.23. There was no contrary evidence offered by Manti. 
Call also established his lost profits by testimony of 
an expert witness. Charles Peterson of Frank Stuart & 
Associates, an economic consultant, was qualified as an expert 
witness and allowed to testify. (Tr. p. 260-264.) He testified 
that had Call been allowed to complete the contract, Call's lost 
profits would have totalled $136,334. (Tr. p. 271, plaintiff's 
Exhibit 44.) No contrary expert testimony was offered by Manti. 
Finally, to establish lost profits, Call submitted 
into evidence his financial records for the years 1981, 1982, 
1983, 1984 and 1986. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 35 and 36.) 1982 
was the year that Manti breached the year of the contract. 
Call's financial records for 1985 were not available. In 1986, 
Mr. Call was seriously ill requiring hospitalization and absence 
from his business. Nevertheless, the financial documents showed 
that Call's profits margins averaged 11.96 percent. However, by 
eliminating 1982's loss of 18.27, the year that Manti breached 
the contract, the average profit margin for the remaining years 
averages 18.6 percent. Taking the gross receipts that Call would 
have received of $377,844.23 times the average profit margin of 
18.6 percent shows that Call sustained minimum damages of $70,278 
as lost profits. 
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, Call's counsel 
made a motion for directed verdict for $56,377.60. The motion 
was based on the following figures: $377,844 gross receipts 
which Call would have received, minus $22,000 paid to Call, times 
Thurgood & Associates' profit margin rate of 15 percent for a 
total of $56,377.60. The Court admitted that the defendant did 
not put on a case but nevertheless denied the motion. 
Thereafter, Call made a motion for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and/or a new trial. Those motions were 
denied by the Court also. 
B. Legal Analysis 
The criteria for granting a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or a directed verdict is the same. Koer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 19 U.2nd 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). That is whether 
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined 
from the evidence presented. Management Committee v. Graystone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 30 
U.2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). Call's uncontroverted and 
unimpeached evidence shows that the minimum amount of damages 
sustained by Call was $56,377. There is no rational formula for 
calculating damages lower than that. To calculate a judgment for 
less than that requires a jury to totally disregard: 1) the 
testimony of the business owner John Call; 2) the expert 
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testimony of economic consultant Chuck Peterson and C.P.A. Randy 
Peterson; 3) the Call contract itself; 4) the testimony of the 
replacement engineer, David Thurgood; 5) the financial records of 
John Call Engineering; and, 6) the time records of David 
Thurgood. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the jury did. It 
ignored each and every piece of plaintiff's uncontroverted 
evidence. If there was ever a case where reasonable minds could 
not differ as to the minimum amount of sustained damages, this 
case is it. 
Further, there was insufficient evidence to justify the 
minimal verdict entered by the jury. Each verdict must be 
supported by some competent evidence. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Skeen, 8 U.2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
The criteria as to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
justify the verdict is essentially the same test as to whether a 
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict should 
be granted; that is, whether reasonable men could draw different 
conclusions from conflicting evidence. Polleshe v. Transamerica 
Insurance Company, 27 U.2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972). In the 
present case, the only evidence that was put in the trial was 
plaintiff's case. There was no conflicting evidence. It is 
impossible for reasonable men to draw different conclusions as to 
the minimum amount of Call's damages. It is impossible to 
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rationally calculate damage at a figure less than $56,377. It 
cannot be done. 
New trials are to be awarded when there is insufficient 
evidence to justify the verdict or when there have been errors in 
law. In this case both elements are present. Call is entitled 
to a new trial. 
POINT VI - THE COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND 
PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY 
A. Factual Background 
Prior to the taking of testimony, Call moved to exclude 
evidence and argument on the following irrelevant and prejudicial 
issues: 
1) Whether Call should be paid for work not 
performed; 
2) Whether the judgment would have to be paid out of 
taxpayer's pockets; and 
3) Whether Call should have mitigated his damages. 
The Court denied Call's motion but noted that it would sustain 
objections to issues 1) and 2). (Tr. p. 66, 67, 71.) 
During the trial, the following prejudicial issues and 
arguments were allowed into the trial over Call's objection: 
1) The contract was in dispute. (Tr. p. 79-81.) 
2) Call was paid for everything he did. (Tr. p. 81.) 
36 
3) Call could not proceed without written authority. 
(Tr. p. 210-211.) 
4) The taxpayer's would have to pay Call. (Tr. p. 
318. ) 
B. Legal Analysis 
The trial court has the obligation of controlling the 
argument and issues presented to the jury. Hales v. Peterson, 
11 U.2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). Counsel is allowed only to 
argue the law as instructed to the jury and apply the 
instructions to the facts. Harmon v. Sprouse Reitz, Co., 21 Utah 
2d 361, 445 P.2d 773 (Utah 1968). Counsel may not argue law that 
would not be correct jury instructions. Patton v. Heinkson, 380 
P.2d 916 (Nev. 1963); Zelman v. Stauder, 468 P.2d 943 (Ariz. App. 
1978); Williamson v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 487 P.2d 110 (Or. 
App. 1971). 
Manti's argument that the contract was in dispute and 
that Call needed written authorization is contrary to the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling in the first appeal of this case. 
Manti's argument that taxpayers would have to pay 
Call's judgment was designed to elicit sympathy, appeal to 
passion and cannot be sanctioned by any court. c.f. Eager v. 
Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1966). 
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Arguments referring to how a judgment can be paid are 
clearly improper. 
C. Conclusion 
Manti injected improper and prejudicial arguments and 
issues into the proceedings requiring a new trial. 
POINT VII - CALL SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE 
COSTS 
A. Factual Background 
The jury awarded Call a judgment for $13,440. 
Thereafter, Call filed a memorandum of cost totalling $11,092-71. 
Of the $11,092.71 requested, $9,812.54 was spent for expert 
witness fees incurred in the two trials. Call submits that the 
costs were necessarily incurred in good faith and were essential 
to the development of Call's case. For these reasons, Call 
should be awarded his costs incurred.' 
At trial, Call sought lost profits caused by Manti's 
breach of an engineering service contract. Lost profits may be 
proven by: 1) expert opinion; 2) testimony of the business owner; 
3) records of a similar business; 4) testimony of a similar 
business owner; 5) past financial records. 
Call showed lost profits by comparing the records and 
contract of the engineering firm (Thurgood) that completed the 
sewer project with the Call contract rates. Because the Thurgood 
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contract and Call contract differed on their hourly rates, Call 
needed a witness who could correlate the hourly rates that Call 
would have received on his contract with the engineering work 
actually performed on the sewer contract. The witness was Randy 
Peterson. Randy Peterson compared the contracts, established the 
hourly rates and made the mathematical computations. For these 
reasons, the costs incurred for Randy Peterson were reasonable 
and necessary to Call's case. 
In addition, Call showed lost profits through expert 
testimony. Lost profits equals anticipated gross receipts, less 
anticipated expenses to perform the contract. However, not all 
expenses are deducted from gross receipts. Fixed expenses which 
do not decrease with non-performance, are not deducted from the 
expected gross receipts. Call called Frank Stuart & Associates 
to identify and explain to the court and the jury those expenses 
that would be saved by Call not having to perform the contract, 
and those expenses which would still be incurred whether or not 
Call performed the contract. The testimony of Frank Stuart & 
Associates was not only necessary, it was crucial to Call's case. 
Without the testimony, Call could not establish a net profit 
figure to submit to the jury. 
B. Legal Analysis 
Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 provides that witnesses legally 
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required or in good faith requested to attend a District Court 
shall be paid $14 per day plus $.30 per mile for travel- This 
section, however, does not place a limit upon what an expert 
witness can be paid. Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-8 provides "the fees 
of a witness paid in a civil cause may be taxed against the 
losing party". Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-8 does not place a limit 
upon the amount of fees that can be paid an expert or that may be 
taxed to the other party. However, traditionally the Utah Courts 
held "that expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation 
unless the statute expressly so provides". Frampton v. Wilson, 
605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). 
In contrast, in the more recent case of Highland 
Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 683 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme court awarded costs exceeding 
$2,300 incurred for deposing witnesses including expert 
witnesses. The court justified the award on the basis that the 
complexity of the contract case, and the* theories of recovery 
sought, required the expenditure. Highland, at 1051, 1052. 
Similarly, in the present case, the complexity of the contract 
case and the theories of recovery, required expert testimony. 
It makes no sense to award expert witness deposition testimony 
costs and not expert witness trial testimony costs. 
In Utah, costs are closely examined for "the purpose 
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of guarding against abuse by those better financially equipped, 
lest the costs of seeking justice become prohibitive for the 
financially ill equipped". Highland, at 1051. Unless, 
plaintiffs, such as Call, are awarded their expert witness fee 
costs, the costs of seeking justice becomes prohibitive. For 
example in the present case, Call was awarded a judgment of 
$13,440.00 plus pre-judgment interest $6,832.00, but if attorneys 
fees (1/3 of the recovery) and costs incurred are both 
subtracted from the judgment, Call receives only about 
$2,391.00. Seeking justice for Call and others like him becomes 
prohibitive in any complex contract case. The rights of Call as 
guaranteed by Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
become meaningless. Section 11 states: 
All Courts shall be open and every person 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation shall have remedy by 
due course of law which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
If Call is not awarded the costs for the expert witness 
fees, he is not provided a remedy for the breach of contract 
created by Manti. For these reasons and others, many states, 
award costs of expert witness fees either by statute or rule. 
e.g. , Kaps v* Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 572 P.2d 72 (Alaska 
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1977) (rule); R. T, Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 674 P.2d 1036 (Idaho App. 
1983) (rule); American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 558 
P.2d 1211 (Or. 1976) (statute); Blasdel v. Montana Power Co., 640 
P.2d 889 (Mont. 1982) (statute); Mays v. Todaro, 626 P.2d 260 
(Nev. 1981) (statute); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 




After the Supreme Court decision in John Call 
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp, 743 P.2d 1205 (1987), Call 
was entitled to have a trial solely to determine the amount of 
lost profits sustained by Call as a result of Manti's breach of 
the engineering services contract. 
On remand, the trial court allowed irrelevant and 
prejudicial issues to contaminate the second trial. Further, 
the trial court refused to instruct the jury as to how lost 
profits are calculated. 
Further, Call was entitled to a directed verdict or a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a sum of not less than 
$56,377.00. 
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For these reasons, the Court should amend the judgment 
to $56,377 or remand the case for a new trial on the issues of 
damages. 
DATED this day of February, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff\Appellant 
By: 
DALE F. GARDINER 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
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ADDENDUM 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
Art. I § 11 
Utah Const i tu t ion 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL ENGINEERING, INC., ; 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) 
MANTI CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, ' 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 8606 
i JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
What amount of Gross Profits 
of money do you find that the 
plaintiff John Call Engineer-
ing Inc. would have earned if 
it had been allowed to fully 
complete the Engineering Ser-
vices Contract? $ 
What amount of expenses did 
John Call Engineering Inc. 
save by not having to fully 
complete the Engineering Ser-
vices Contract with Manti 
City? $ 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq., 61A Am. Jur. 2d as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238. judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1 reeled verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et Key Numbers. — Motions «=» 1 et seq.; 
seq., 211 et seq. Pleading «• 38V2 to 186, 187 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
22 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F R C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, Rule 15 
Arbitration, § 78-3la-1 et seq. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq 
Defenses and objections, Rule 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 78-3-16 5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14, Appx G, Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, Rule 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, Rule 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, Rule 
12(d). 
Interpleader, Rule 22. 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23 to 24. 
Numbered paragraphs, Rule 10(b) 
One form of action, Rule 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, 
§ 70A-9-203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished, Rule 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Statute of frauds, investment securities, 
§ 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, Rule 14. 
Time for answer, Rules 3(b), 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affirmative defenses 




—Election of remedies 
—Estoppel 
Failure to plead 
—Failure of consideration 
Failure to plead 
——Pleading 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment. 
Denial 
Notice and opportunity 
Waiver of defense. 
—Fraud 
Necessary allegations 
—Mitigation of damages 
Failure to plead 
Pleading 
—Mutual mistake 
—Statute of frauds 
Motion to dismiss 
Pleading 
—Statute of limitations. 




Claims for relief 
—Amendment of pleading. 
—Attorney fees 
—Essential allegations. 
Alienation of affections 
—Request for alternative relief 
—Sufficiency of complaint 
Attachment of exhibit 





—Election between claims 
—Election of remedies under contract. 
—Res judicata 
—Separate claims 
Contract and quantum meruit 
Defenses 
—Lack of consideration. 
Purpose of rules 
Cited 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 59 Am Jur 2d Parties or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
LS8 et seq ALR4th 338 
2.J.S. — 67 C J S Parties §§ 72 to 84 Key Numbers. — Parties «=» 49 to 56 
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution 
Kule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires A party shall plead m response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated m all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted m the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective m its statement of a claim for relief or defense If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 15, F R C P 
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—Afler pretrial order. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response. 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
—Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judgment. 






—Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
—Following dismissal. 
—Late amendment. 
Day of trial. 
-—Durjng or after trial. 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
Consent to try issue. 
-Evidence supporting findings. 
Issue raised by complaint. 
—Consent to try issue. 
Not found. 
—Construction of rule. 
—Defense not pleaded. 
Affirmative defense. 
Issue tried by parties. 
—Failure to object to evidence. 
—Issues not pleaded. 
Mutual mistake. 
—New cause of action. 
Child support. 




—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried. 
• Relation back of amendments. 
—Adding or substituting parties. 
—Statute of limitations. 







—After pretrial order. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in al-
lowing defendant to amend his answer to in-
DECISIONS 
elude as a defense an issue that had been spe-
cifically excluded as a trial issue by a pretrial 
order, where the amendment was made long 
before trial, the opposing party had adequate 
opportunity to meet the additonal issue raised, 
and neither party was placed in a position of 
any greater advantage or disadvantage or prej-
udice by virtue of the amendment to the plead-
ing. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 
1981). 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Where, as a condition to filing their fourth 
amended complaint, appellants agreed to pay a 
$150 attorney fee, it was neither coercive nor 
unfair to them and is not a ground for reversal 
regardless of whether or not the payment of 
such attorney's fees are authorized by the 
Rules. The alternative was to dismiss, and in 
granting a dismissal without prejudice the 
court could stay any new action that might be 
commenced until costs of the action that had 
been dismissed including attorney's fees had 
been paid. The appellants invited the court to 
impose such conditions in order to avoid a dis-
missal and the necessity of starting over again. 
Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 123 Utah 158, 256 
P.2d 699 (1953). 
Prolix complaint 
Where complaint was prolix rather than be-
ing a short, concise statement of a claim as 
contemplated by Rules 8(a) and 8(e)(1), it was 
reasonable to permit plantiff to redraft plead-
ings rather than dismiss the action without 
prejudice. McGavin v. Preferred Ins. Exch., 7 
Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958). 
—Amendment of response. 
Whether a motion to amend a response to an 
amended complaint should be allowed more 
than ten days after the amended complaint 
was filed lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 528 P.2d 
802 (Utah 1974). 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
In personal injury action in which defen-
dant's insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend 
insured and lawyer had not met defendant 
until just before taking his deposition and 
therefore did not know that defendant had in-
juries and believed plaintiff to have been at 
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to 
include counterclaim was an abuse of discre-
tion since case was one where "justice re-
quires" amendment. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 
Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971). 
UTAH RULES CIVIL fKUOMJUKfc 
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall spec-
ify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
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nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 50, F R C P 





After failure to seek directed verdict 
—Directed verdict nunc pro tunc 
—Evidence 
—Findings and conclusions not required 
—Instruction for directed verdict 





—Ruling on reserved motion 




In reality, ordering a directed verdict is an 
act of the court, the signing and entry thereof 
being formalities paying tribute to the history 
of the practice Finlayson v Brady, 121 Utah 
204, 240 P2d 491 (1952) 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when 
the court is able to conclude, as a matter of 
law, that reasonable minds would not differ on 
the facts to be determined from the evidence 
presented Management Comm v Graystone 
Pines, Inc, 652 P 2d 896 (Utah 1982) ~ 
—Appeal. 
Supreme Court s standard of review of a di-
rected verdict is the same as that imposed upon 
the trial court the evidence must be examined 
in the light most favorable to the losing party, 
and if there is a reasonable basis in the evi-
dence and in the inferences to be drawn there-
from that would support a judgment in favor of 
the losing partv, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained Management Comm v Graystone 
Pines Inc , 652 P 2d 896 (Utah 1982) 
The Supreme Court will sustain the grant-
ing of a motion for a directed verdict onl\ if the 
evidence was such that reasonable men could 
not arrive at a different conclusion Anderson 
v Gnbble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P 2d 432 (1973) 
After failure to seek directed verdict 
Although party who does not move for di-
rected verdict generally has no standing to ap-
peal on the basis that the evidence does not 
support the judgment, an exception exists 
where plain error appears in the record and 
would result in a miscarriage of justice Hen-
derson v Meyer, 533 P 2d 290 (Utah 1975) 
—Directed verdict nunc pro tunc. 
Where court inadvertently ordered entry of 
judgment rather than a directed verdict, and 
through oversight the jury was discharged 
without signing a verdict, the court could prop-
erly vacate the judgment, and order a directed 
verdict nunc pro tunc Finlayson v Brady, 121 
Utah 204, 240 P 2d 491 (1952) 
—Evidence. 
In directing a verdict, the court must exam-
ine the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the party against whom the verdict is in-
tended, and it is not its province to weigh or 
determine the preponderance of the evidence 
Finlavson v Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P 2d 
491 (1952) 
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, 
the court must consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion is directed and must resolve every 
controverted fact in his favor Boskovich v 
Utah Constr Co , 123 Utah 387, 259 P 2d 885 
(1953) 
A directed verdict pursuant to Subdivision 
(a) upon the ground that the evidencs fails to 
show that defendant is negligent, is tanta-
mount to granting a motion for a non suit and 
on appeal must be reversed if the evidence is 
such that reasonable men could arrive at a dif 
ferent conclusion Rhiness v Dansie, 24 Utah 
2d 375, 472 P 2d 428 (1970) 
Mere fact defendant's horses escaped from 
inclosure was not sufficient, under § 41-6 38 
to justify submitting defendants negligence tc 
jurv in action by motorist whose vehicle struck 
a horse, and thus directed verdict for defendant 
was proper Rhiness v Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375 
472 P2d 428 (1970) 
In suit by w lfe for her personal injuries anc 
husband s wTongful death in collision, wife'1 
claim for injuries should have been submittec 
to jury since there was no evidence to establish 
any basis to impute alleged negligence of hus 
band-driver to wife, wrongful death claim alsc 
presented question for jury since there wen 
fact issues as to whether defendant s trucl 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
. tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
Dutv charge everything merged in and adjudicated 
Attachment ^y t n e Judgment. Sierra Nev Mill Co. v Keith 
Effec t# ' O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943. 
Acceptance of full payment
 Q Q r a t t o 
Owner or attorney. * 
^-Vacation of satisfaction. —Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
Court Hearing. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
IJuty. kv judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
Attachment out action and hearing in equity, and the hen 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
 0f an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
tial satisfacton of judgment to extent of money
 m e n t does not include his personal right to exe-
collected through attachment proceeding.
 c u t e against the judgment debtor. Utah C V. 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805.
 Fe± C r e d l t U m o n v jen k lns, 528 P 2d 1187 
Effect (Utah 1974). 
—Acceptance of full payment 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment, 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery', such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shal] 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F R C P 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of motion 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Caption on motion for new trial 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record 
Costs 
Decision against law 
Discretion of tnal court 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency 
Excessive or inadequate damages 
Failure to object to findings of fact 
Filing of affidavits 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel 
Misconduct of jury 
Motion to alter or amend judgment 
Motion to be presented to trial court 
Newly discovered evidence 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Particulanzation of grounds for motion for new 
tnal 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must 
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention Bailev v Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P 2d 
1043 (Utah 1984) 
Accident or surprise. 
A "surprise" at trial which could have been 
easily guarded against by utilization of avail-
able discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3) 
Anderson v Bradley, 590 P 2d 339 (Utah 
1979) 
Failure to interpose a timely objection to tes-
timony challenged on the ground of surprise 
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion 
for a new tnal on that ground Chournos v 
D'Agnillo, 642 P 2d 710 (Utah 1982) 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new tnal on 
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of 
the defendant's expert witness where the 
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either 
before, or immediately after, it was given 
Jensen v Thomas, 570 P 2d 695 (Utah 1977) 
Claim of error based on accident or surprise, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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